T he 29% of the area of the United States that is in public land contains a rich store of biotic and abiotic resources available to its owners, the American people. Deciding whether, how, and by whom these resources are to be used is the foremost challenge facing those who set public policy for natural resources. A number of land management agencies are vested with the responsibility of carrying out the prescriptions of public policy, and have, or had until recently, research arms charged with providing scientific information to enlighten policymaking and management.
Ecologists understand very well that deciding whether and how public resources are to be used-that is, the process of setting public policy-is highly contentious because of the differing values attached to these resources by different subsets of American society. Those values commonly conflict, and resolution is not often mutually satisfactory.
It is also not news to ecologists that the structure and function of biological resources, as well as the responses to their use and management, are among the most complex issues addressed by the field of ecology. Policy setting is most likely to be rational and socially optimal if this complexity is thoroughly elucidated by accurate and objective research. This is not to say that policies are set only on the basis of science. As Sabatier (1978) states, "No policy decision can be based solely on technical information. Normative elements invariably enter." But if not enlightened by quality research, policy is based on guess, hearsay, and traditional knowledge, and ultimately is determined by power politics.
Thus, the research carried out to enlighten the policymaking process not only copes with the conceptual and methodological challenges posed by the complexity of its subject matter, but is commonly conducted in the contentious climate of policy disputes within which the agencies function. As a result, agency researchers often struggle to produce the accurate and objective research that is needed to fully enlighten the policy process and management. These efforts are often successful, as shown by a long history of distinguished research on many natural resources issues. Hence, I find extremely disturbing the continuing flow of literature (e.g., Schiff 1962 , Chase 1986 , Smith 1988 , Anonymous 1989 , Forster 1990 , Hirt 1994 , Yaffee 1994 , Hutchings et al. 1997 ) describing instances in which research is manipulated to support agency policy positions. One of the most recent and troubling is a book by Todd Wilkinson (1998) , Science under Siege. It chronicles the cases of eight scientists in five federal agencies and one state agency who were ordered either to condone management actions they knew to be environmentally damaging and contrary to their agencies' mandates; rewrite environmental documents which would condone management actions inimical to resource protection; make public statements contrary to their professional judgment that proposed activities would damage resources; or simply remain silent. These are, admittedly, extreme cases, used by Wilkinson to call attention to the problem. But on the basis of his investigations, he believes that the problem is widespread, although generally more subtle than indicated by the egregious instances described in his book.
In those cases, the agencies were facilitating or supporting land-use actions by private economic interests that the scientists who spoke out considered detrimental to the natural resources in their care. In most cases, the economic interests sought the support of politically influential persons to pressure the agencies, under the threat of discontinued funding, into silencing, transferring, or dismissing the employees who were attempting to protect the resources.
I argue in this article that agency research is more likely to be objective if it is conducted at some administrative distance from the policymaking process, either in a separate division or other administrative structure, or carried out in an organization that does not have sole responsibility for setting policy internally. I conclude with a case study of the difficulty of getting scientific objectivity when research is conducted in, or controlled by, the administrative body that sets policy.
Changing institutional arrangements for setting natural resources policy
I propose that one means of preventing the kinds of pressures on science that Wilkinson and other authors describe is through organizational structure. Hence it is useful to understand the political history and institutional circumstances in which these pressures arise. The federal land management agencies were established in the late 1800s and early 1900s with assigned missions: the Forest Service, under the US Department of Agriculture, to protect and administer the use of timber resources in the national forests; the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior, to oversee private livestock grazing and mining on public lands; and the Fish and Wildlife Service, also under the Department of the Interior, to protect and administer the use of wildlife resources not under the jurisdiction of the states (Nelson 1995a (Nelson , 1995b . These agencies' missions were strongly oriented to consumptive use when the nation was largely rural and agricultural, and were therefore consistent with societal values.
Since the commodity resources of the public lands are exploited by private interests-livestock grazing by ranchers, timber harvesting by timber companies, mineral extraction by mining companies-it was natural that alliances would develop between the agencies and the economic interests. At the requests of the latter, these alliances were watched over by local congressional delegations whose members served on the various House and Senate committees that controlled the agencies' funding. The result was triangular relationships between the agencies, economic interests, and local members of Congress.
The first half of the 20th century also witnessed the development of research divisions in the Forest Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service. Much of these new divisions' efforts were focused on investigating the effects of maximum yields and efficient harvesting on, respectively, timber and wildlife resources. The National Park Service, another Interior Department agency, developed a small research effort dispersed among its regions and parks to provide data to guide resource management in the parks. The BLM never developed a formal research program.
The prevailing political philosophy in the early 20th century was progressivism, most notably advocated by Teddy Roosevelt (Nelson 1995b). In the natural resources agencies, this philosophy was embodied by the premise that it was the technically trained agency people, with the most knowledge of the resources, who should tell the American people what was in their best interests. Motivated by their agencies' historic missions and their professional training in resource extraction, agency leadership prescribed policies advocating efficient, science-based harvesting of resources. Thus, management policies were set within these executive branch agencies (Nelson 1995a) , with strong influence from the three-way alliances among the agencies, economic interests, and congressional delegations.
Associated with the urbanization of the 20th century, societal values concerning nature and the outdoors changed. Simultaneously, the science of ecology developed a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of natural ecosystems and the effects of commodity extraction on them. As a consequence, the public became less accepting of the agencies' stewardship of natural resources.
The result was a shift in political pressures that prompted Congress to legislate two important changes in progressivestyle, natural-resources management. First, the Forest Service and BLM received mandates to broaden their respective missions: the Forest Service by means of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 and the BLM through the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976. These acts ordered the agencies to move away from their historic, almost exclusive emphasis on commodity resources toward a more evenhanded commitment to all resources on their lands.
Second, a series of legislative and administrative changes were made, which weakened the internal policy-setting powers the agencies had enjoyed since the Progressive Era. The Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 ordered the Forest Service to engage in extensive, longterm planning for each of its national forests, and the National Forest Management Act of 1976 directed that agency to include representatives of all concerned public interests in the planning process. National forest policies were thus being set by combinations of interested parties.
No comparable legislation was applied to the BLM. But that agency has adopted a number of analogous planning procedures that bring together representatives of interest groupsthe livestock industry, wildlife advocacy groups, environmental organizations, and wild horse advocates, as well as agency representatives-who deliberate on how many animals of each class are to be carried on the herd management areas of the public domain lands. One such procedure is termed coordinated resource management planning.
Greater public involvement in BLM policymaking has also been effected by administrative action. Unlike the Forest Service, whose basic administrative unit is the national forest, the BLM is segmented into administrative units conterminous with the states. Each state with significant public domain land has its own BLM office, director, and staff. Until 1996, each state had its own advisory board, disproportionately consisting-in the eyes of critics-of individuals representing commodity interests. In 1996, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt revised these boards, renaming them "resource advisory councils" and stipulating that they have a balanced membership of individuals representing all groups concerned with management of public domain lands.
Thus, the policy setting process for the national forests and public domain lands has been changed from one of almost complete discretion by the Forest Service and the BLM during the Progressive Era to procedures that today are more responsive to the full array of societal values. In the lexicon of political science, these arrangements are termed interestgroup pluralism. A national forest supervisor recently commented in my presence: "I no longer set policies. I just carry out what I am told by others."
In democratic political theory, this is as it should be. The policy literature now converges on the view that public policies are set to satisfy societal values (Kennedy 1985 , Wagner 1994 . The executive agencies are staffed with technically trained individuals who are experts in their professions, but whose values do not necessarily coincide with those of the American public. Their responsibility is to execute, not, in a sense, legislate, as they did under progressivism, and under frequently broad legislative mandates that allowed much latitude for internally initiated policy change. A prime example of this change is the Forest Service's shift from a primarily custodial management role in the national forests in the first half of the 20th century to one of coordinating large-scale timber harvesting in the second half (Hirt 1994 , Nelson 1995a . The new procedures give all concerned interests a voice in the decisions, and by default reduce the powers held by the economic interests under progressivism.
One more administrative change has widened the administrative space between policymaking and research. While research and resource management in the Forest Service continue in the same agency, research is in a separate division from forest management. In the Department of the Interior, Secretary Babbitt removed biological research from all Interior agencies in 1993, moving them into the newly formed National Biological Survey (later to become the Biological Resources Division of the US Geological Survey). He did this for several reasons, one of which was to remove research from policy pressures, thus enhancing objectivity and providing investigators full freedom to report their results uninfluenced by agency and political pressures.
Thus, the policy and administrative trends in the management of natural resources on public lands in the latter half of the 20th century were toward reducing the policy setting prerogatives of the executive agencies by moving those prerogatives more into the hands of representative arrays of concerned interests; and, both by this means and administrative change, distancing research from the policy process.
These changes have been made in part to help free research from policy pressures. The literature on the role of research in policymaking describes several ways in which the policy positions of agencies color research objectivity (Wagner 1989) . These range from organizational loyalty on the part of researchers who find it uncomfortable to report research results that challenge their organizations' policies, to overt coercion of scientists by administrative higher-ups, as in the cases described by Wilkinson (1998) .
Agencies have the prerogative and responsibility to set research agendas that provide the information needed to enlighten management efforts. But the ethical line is crossed when evidence is selected that supports policy positions while contrary evidence is ignored or suppressed (Schiff 1962) , or when research is instituted that will provide answers supportive of policy while studies that are likely to shed critical but valid light on policy are avoided or never initiated (Chase 1986) .
Freeing the executive branch agencies from the role and prerogatives of policymaking should reduce their sense of ownership of the policies, a tendency to defend them, and thus their resistance to contrary research results. At the same time, the administrative distancing of research in the Department of the Interior has also been done in part to facilitate research objectivity and full disclosure of scientific results, whether or not they support current policies (Wagner 1999b ).
There appears to have been progress toward greater objectivity and fuller disclosure in the past 10-20 years. For instance, conflicting views on the environmental impact of the Exxon Valdez oil spill have been reported openly. Although there were early efforts to control the information flow on the spotted owl issue (Anonymous 1989 ,Yaffee 1994 , relevant information on the matter is now in the public domain. Overexploitation of marine fisheries now appears to be conceded by all sides of the issue, and major disagreement is primarily over solutions.
Thus, it is disconcerting to read about the cases described in Wilkinson's (1998) book; hear his assertion that these situations are still common, if less extreme, in the agencies; and ponder his comment, "It means that science is forever a hostage to politicized science and meddling" (p. 110). One has to hope that these are vestiges of a receding progressivism.
A remnant of progressivism needing change
Unlike the Forest Service and the BLM, the National Park Service for the most part does not allow commodity extraction on the lands it administers. Consequently, the Park Service has not been subjected to the same commodity-oriented political pressures experienced by the other two agencies. Instead, pressures tend to focus locally on the individual parks. Issues of contention include economic concerns of gateway communities, the activities of park concessionaires, and the concerns of local wildlife and environmental groups (Wagner et al. 1995) .
Moreover, the parks vary so widely in terms of size, general reason for being, and tourist appeal that the pressure groups tend to be locally based and unique to each park. Hence, they are less likely to form regional power blocks, as the timber industry has done in connection with western national forests, and the livestock and mining industries in connection with BLM lands. Thus, one hears complaints from individuals in communities near parks about a lack of responsiveness, yet the National Park Service has the highest public-approval rating of any federal land management agency in the United States.
Probably as a result, the Park Service has not been the subject of national legislation like the National Forest Management Act, which mandates major public involvement in policymaking. Rather, its most recent policy document, titled Management Policies (National Park Service 1988), stipulates that "servicewide policy will be articulated by the Director of the National Park Service.... Park-specific instructions, procedures, directives...may be set by superintendents within formal delegations of authority" (p. ix). Thus, to a considerable degree, the Park Service still employs internal policy setting under the Progressive Era model.
The national parks do follow the public involvement procedures of the National Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered Species Act, however. Yellowstone National Park prepared a major environmental impact statement for wolf introduction, as did Olympic National Park for mountain goat removal. Yellowstone and Grand Teton National Park issued public invitations for hearings on snowmobile use. But these efforts tend to be directed more to ad hoc management efforts than exercises of general policies that provide long-term philosophy and direction for park management.
As I have already noted, the National Park Service also had its own research program until 1993, when that function was transferred into the newly formed National Biological Survey. Although the Park Service never developed a research effort sufficient to address the immense range of resource management problems in the National Park System requiring scientific enlightenment ), Halvorson and Davis (1996) describe research that helped solve several major problems. Examples include research showing the need for the judicious use of fire to maintain natural conditions in mixed conifer forests in the Sierra Nevada (California) parks, the sources of air quality impairment in the Grand Canyon, and the effects of surface hydrology and visitor use on the water quality in the Ozark National Scenic Riverways. Thus, although limited in extent, research in the Park Service appears to have functioned effectively and freely in a number of parks under the progressive model. However, Yellowstone National Park, which probably has had the largest volume of research of any national park, has a three-decade history of contention over its science. That dispute has been intertwined with changes in management policies set internally by park administration, primarily in connection with Yellowstone's northern range.
Management of the biological resources in the park have gone through three stages since its establishment in 1872 as the first national park in the United States and the world. The first stage, continuing until about the 1930s, involved management measures considered appropriate at that time, and that favored increases in the ungulate population: predator control, ungulate winter feeding, fire suppression, and protection of ungulates from hunting.
The second stage began around 1930, by which time the northern range elk population had grown to levels at which park biologists concluded that northern range resources were sustaining serious damage. Park officials began population control by trapping and shooting. By 1968, the northern elk herd, which had, according to park officials, reached 20,000-35,000 by the turn of the century, had been reduced to 3,172 censused animals (Houston 1982) . At that point, the local congressional delegations, responding to complaints of hunters and guides among their constituents, ordered the park to stop controlling the herd (US Senate 1967). In response, the park issued a new policy in 1967, commonly termed the "natural-regulation" policy (National Park Service 1967a , 1967b . The emphasis of the new policy was on eliminating human management actions and allowing park resources to be governed by "natural" processes. In addition to ending ungulate population control, Yellowstone eliminated garbage dumps and artificial feeding, which attracted bears, stopped suppressing naturally set fires, and ended control of forest insect outbreaks.
In 1971, a Yellowstone biologist (Houston 1971) proposed a natural-regulation ecological hypothesis predicting that, following the 1968 low point, the northern elk herd would "regulate" its own numbers at modest levels without human intercession and that it would do so without undue impact on the northern range ecosystem. Thus, in a sense, the scientific hypothesis supported the management policy.
Part of the northern range dispute has been over the appropriateness of the policy and its effects on the ecosystem. That is a value question I do not address here, and on which I do not take a position.
It is the scientific contention that is relevant to this article, and which I dwell on here. It has arisen over conflicting interpretations of the evidence on how the natural-regulation policy affects the northern range ecosystem, and whether the evidence sustains the natural regulation hypothesis. There is now sufficient documentation indicating that Yellowstone science has been managed over the past three decades to prevent significant challenge to the natural regulation policy and the validity of the hypothesis.
The case of the grizzly bear provides the longest-standing and best-chronicled instance of this control of Yellowstone science. In 1970, John and Frank Craighead, who had conducted 11 years of research on Yellowstone grizzlies, and unquestionably were the most knowledgeable scientists about the species' ecology in the park, were forbidden to conduct further research there. This action was precipitated by the Craigheads' concern over the effects of the policy change on the bear population, and their challenge to the park's assessment of those effects (Mattson and Craighead 1994, Craighead et al. 1995) .
In 1983, R. B. Finley, Jr. charged the park with refusing to release data on grizzlies, which were needed by a member of the Interagency Grizzly Bear Study Team to examine the status of the population. In 1993, the data files of Yellowstone bear biologist David Mattson were removed and placed under lock and key by his superior, who also ordered the office secretary to open Mattson's mail. Mattson was subsequently transferred to another state. All of this was because he disagreed with his superior over the inference drawn from park data on grizzly population trends (Mattson and Craighead 1994, Wilkinson 1998) . Most recently, Craig Pease, research ecologist on the Vermont Law School faculty and senior author of the only study of park grizzly bear population dynamics not funded or controlled by the park, has been denied data from park files that he needed to continue his research (personal comment, May 10, 2001) .
The controversy over the effects of ungulate management in Yellowstone Park is perhaps more widely known in the scientific community than the bear dispute, but the efforts to control the science on ungulate management are less publicized. Chase (1986) was the first to write extensively on the subject. In criticizing the natural-regulation policy, he was obliged to file Freedom of Information Act requests because his requests for Yellowstone information were denied.
In 1993, park biologist Richard Keigley's manuscript on Yellowstone National park cottonwoods was held up for several months until he removed text pointing out the implications of his findings for the policy (Clifford 1993) , and he was later ordered to discontinue innovative research that promised to reconstruct the history of ungulate use on other northernrange woody species. Keigley had outspokenly asserted that his evidence showed that Yellowstone management policies were seriously affecting park resources, contrary to the claims of park administrators. The transfer of Yellowstone biologists to the National Biological Survey in October 1993 administratively removed them from supervision by the park. But Yellowstone administrators are still able to exert control over park science by discretionary issuance of permits to conduct research in the park. In 1995 Keigley, now an agency biologist with the National Biological Survey, was denied a permit to conduct research on other woody species in the park. In 1997, he was forbidden to respond to a request from a congressional committee to testify on Yellowstone science, and the committee was obliged to subpoena him. Keigley's most recent request for a permit to photograph willows in the park has received no response.
In July 1999, a noted ecologist from a major university told me, "I want to do research in the park, so I don't dare get them mad at me or they won't give me a permit." Another equally noted ecologist from another university, who was conducting research in Yellowstone, told me in September 1997, "We have to be careful about what we say [in our publications]." These are but a few examples of a broader phenomenon. There is little question that Yellowstone National Park manages the science in a number of ways to minimize the generation of research results that challenge the natural regulation hypothesis and the resultant management policy, and to avoid criticism by investigators.
Conclusion
The problems with Yellowstone research are Exhibit A for my main thesis: Research objectivity in public agencies, urgently needed in resolving complex management problems, can be enhanced by two administrative and institutional arrangements. The first is administrative distancing between policy setting and research. Hutchings et al. (1997) , in a detailed analysis of the problems of bringing open and unbiased science to bear on fishery resources in Canada, advocate precisely this reform. Writing on a situation reminiscent in many ways of that at Yellowstone, these authors advocate "a publicly funded, but politically independent institution...a new natural resource science establishment that could operate unimpeded by bureaucratic and political influence."
But such an arrangement, as exemplified by the transfer of Interior Department research to the National Biological Survey, has not been sufficient on its own to undo the constraints on Yellowstone science. The needed second approach is to change from the internal policy setting of the progressive model to protocols with strong public involvement-some form of interest group pluralism. Making such a change would eliminate an irony of the progressive model: Having generated a policy internally, an agency tends to defend its decision, and in turn tends to resist science that is critical of its position (Downs 1967) . If relieved of the ownership of policies by having them set by others in a more democratic process, agencies would be less likely to defend them and consequently less inclined to try to influence the direction of the science.
As I have already noted, the Forest Service and the BLM have adopted such public-involvement procedures in their policy setting. But the National Park Service has not. Recommending such a change for the Park Service is not new with me. Several reviews have included recommendations for greater public involvement in national park policy setting (Wagner 1999a) . The Gordon Commission study, supported by the National Parks and Conservation Association (Bishop et al. 1989) , recommended the formation of "national, regional, and park Ecosystem Management Advisory Panels." A 1992 joint workshop between Park Service employees and members of the Ecological Society of America recommended "science cooperative groups" (Risser and Lubchenco 1992) . And the Park Service's own Vail Agenda (Briggle et al. 1992) recommended that the service "greatly expand the role of the public in resource stewardship activities and eliminate the barriers to public participation" (p. 133).
In closing, I emphasize that the above comments on managing science have been directed primarily at the science problems of Yellowstone National Park. I do not suggest that they are typical of the National Park System, although there have been critiques of the science in other parks, such as Hess (1993) and Lyman (1998) . But the previous authors' recommendations for greater public involvement in policy setting were directed to the entire system. And the substantial literature calling attention to policy influences on science signals a problem of some magnitude among the agencies.
Freedom is a prerequisite if science is to meet its potential for providing enlightening solutions to environmental problems. Consequently, scientists, interest groups, administrators, and policymakers have a pressing responsibility to consider ways of providing that freedom.
